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 ABSTRACT 
In textbooks and in theory, law is a product of democratic procedures. In reality, however, the 
place of law production has moved to a significant degree from the domestic sphere into an 
emerging domain of supranational and international institutions, bodies, and organizations, 
public or private, which constitute and enforce “global law without a state” (G. Teubner). 
These developments appear to undermine the very foundations of democratic theory and 
practice.  
A global democracy is not in sight. But if we still take the concept of law seriously, and, with 
it, the normative assumption that norms need to be legitimised in order to be called ‘law’, then 
it is worth examining the possible functional equivalents to the norm-generating setting of the 
nation-state: participatory arrangements ensuring the involvement of civil society actors, 
stakeholders, and the public, in the arguing, bargaining, and reasoning processes of 
transnational regulation, procedural rights safeguarding these procedural positions, and courts 
or court-like institutions that flank these arrangements. These potential functional equivalents 
– as elements of a deliberative constitutionalism  - do not replace the democratic process 
necessary for a production of legitimate law, but they might narrow the legitimacy gap 
between the ongoing process of transnational social regulation and democratic constituencies.  
This essay focuses on legal patterns of civil society participation in transnational regulation 
and asks whether the EU, as the most advanced supranational entity with an evolving legal 
framework in the fields of transparency, accountability, and participation, can be taken as a 
positive model for global law production. 
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PARTICIPATORY TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Rainer Nickel* 
 
European University Institute, Florence/University of Frankfurt am Main 
“The upshot of the activities of international organisations is that today most 
citizens greatly underestimate the extent to which most nations’ shipping laws 
are written at the IMO in London, air safety laws at the ICAO in Montreal, 
food standards at the FAO in Rome, intellectual property laws in Geneva at the 
WTO/WIPO, banking laws by the G-10 in Basle, chemical regulations by the 
OECD in Paris, nuclear safety standards by IAEA in Vienna, 
telecommunications laws by the ITU in Geneva and motor vehicle standards by 
the ECE in Geneva.”1 
                                                          
*  Marie Curie Fellow, European University Institute, Florence/Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt 
am Main. The research on this contribution was supported by a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship under the 
European Community’s Sixth Framework Programme (Contract no. MEIF-CT-2003-501237). – I am indebted to 
Christian Joerges, Florian Rödl, and Hauke Brunkhorst for encouraging comments and constructive suggestions. 
1
 J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 488. 
 
I. DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 
In modern democracies, legal norms are products of parliaments - at least, that is what most 
citizens think and take for granted. However, this is not an adequate description of today’s 
reality: it is widely acknowledged and well documented that supranational and international 
entities or arrangements play an increasing role in the shaping of national law. If a significant 
portion of law is ‘written’ elsewhere, instead of by the elected national parliaments, as the 
above quoted authors of a voluminous study on global business regulation suggest, there is 
either a problem with the use of the term ‘law’, or with the concept of democracy that 
underlies our self-description as citizens of democratic states (and a democratic European 
Union). The latter problem of democratic rule is the focus of an intense debate about 
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democracy beyond the nation state, and is fuelled by the perception that the gap between 
normative models of democratic rule and the findings of many studies about the increasing 
amount of rule-making outside the nation states is reaching a critical point. The common 
description of this development is that there is a crisis of democracy which is caused by the 
quasi-natural forces of globalisation: namely, that the growing need for transnational 
regulation is served by governments and private-party networks, and not by parliaments. 
An alternative description of these developments could focus on law instead of 
democracy. The starting point could be that our notion of ‘law’ is an old European one, an 
outdated version of an even more outdated Kantian or Rousseauian model of self-rule and 
self-government: law is not necessarily the product of procedures within parliaments, and of 
governments enforcing it and courts applying it, but can also be produced within networks of 
governments and/or private parties, outside the nation state and in many variations. 
Proponents of a post-modern theory of law have repeatedly made this point. The novelty of 
this idea, compared to very early concepts of law outside or independent of the state,2 is that 
the dissolution of territorially bound democracy and the production of binding rules outside 
the institutional design of national parliaments is no longer an exception but is actually 
becoming the norm.3 In a similar vein, advocates of societal constitutionalism or a concept of 
‘private transnationalism’ argue that the nation state itself has only limited capabilities to 
regulate both the markets and the social sphere within its own borders. Consequently, the 
emerging system of conflict resolution and market regulation at international level does not 
need a statal corset, but guiding procedures and norms which structure the norm-generating 
processes.4 
However, the terminology used to name and describe the legal system emerging 
beyond the nation state clearly suggests that there is uneasiness with this shift in the rule-
making process: the production and enforcement of law beyond the nation state has cautiously 
been labelled governance,5 not government, and the binding rules of the EC/EU are still not 
called ‘law’, but regulations or directives. One of the most interesting details of the new Draft 
Constitutional Treaty of the EU is that it replaces the old EC terminology: regulations become 
                                                          
2
  See Eugen Ehrlich’s sociological concept of a ‘living law’: E. Ehrlich, Gesetz und lebendes Recht, 
(Berlin: Dunckler & Humblot, 1986). This book includes a reprint of the original article from 1915. Ehrlich’s 
idea of living law as a product of society (as opposed to the state-centred approach of the traditional theory of 
law and sociology of law) treated non-statal sources of law as equally legitimate sources as state law, or even as 
the ‘original’ sources of law, and this idea implied the assertion that norms set by non-state actors are part of the 
legal order even if these parts are not officially approved of by the state. The Austrian-German legal profession 
highly contested this view, and Ehrlich’s theory of living law subsequently became the center of a fierce 
controversy between him and Hans Kelsen, see the reprint of the 1915/17 discussion in: H. Kelsen/E. Ehrlich, 
Rechtssoziologie und Rechtswissenschaft: eine Kontroverse (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003). 
3
  J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos (supra n. 2) provide the most comprehensive overview of global business 
regulations that come into being mainly as self-regulations. For rule-making processes in global regulatory 
networks, see A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, N.J./Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
4
  See Ch. Joerges, “Juridification Patterns for Social Regulation and the WTO: A Theoretical 
Framework”, in Ch. Joerges/E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Transnational Trade Governance and Social Regulation: 
Tensions and Interdependencies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006); H. Schepel, The Constitution of 
Private Governance -- Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005). 
5
  On the interdisciplinary concept of governance, see G.-F. Schuppert, “Governance im Spiegel der 
Wissenschaftsdisziplinen”, in: G.-F. Schuppert (ed.), Governance-Forschung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005). 
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European laws, and directives become European framework laws.6 Thus, it seems as if rules 
and regulations deserve to be called ‘laws’ only after a constitutionalisation process has taken 
place. 
The uneasiness with supranational and international rule-making processes found its 
clearest expression in Europe in the 1990’s debates on the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU/EC. Fuelled by decisions of several constitutional courts, the infamous Maastricht 
decision in Germany,7 as well as the respective decisions of the Corte Constitutionale and the 
Conseil Constitutionnel of Italy and France, a wide discussion started about the possibilities 
and the limits of European integration8 and its genuine version of social regulation.9 This 
discussion has produced some new and interesting insights into the possibilities of a 
legitimate law-generating process which is not identical with the familiar structure of our 
nation state model: EU governance is a distinct mode of social regulation that cannot be 
compared to nation-state government arrangements, and should not be measured against 
nation-state standards. 
The starting point here is that the discussion about democratic rule above or beyond 
the nation-state level is often dominated by a number of misleading clichés. The first 
stereotype concerns the law-making process within the nation state itself. Democratic rule is 
portrayed as parliamentary rule, but a closer look at contemporary rule-making processes 
reveals a different picture. Governments and non-state actors play a significant role in the pre-
formation of legal rules. In particular, governments represent highly aggregated entities with 
an enormous potential of resources, manpower, knowledge assessment, and experience. It is 
them – and not the parliaments – which are the primary source and filter for legislative 
proposals. Thus, it is “guvernative structures”, as von Bogdandy calls them,10 that widely 
dominate the law-making process, and not parliamentarians. 
                                                          
6
  See Article I-33 of the Draft Treaty. Article I-6, ‘Union law’, defines the legal rank of EU laws: “The 
Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall 
have primacy over the law of the Member States.” Draft Treaty as amended by the IGC, 6 August 2004, 
document no. CIG 87/04. 
7
  BVerfGE 89, 155-213. - The decision has been criticised as promoting “Der Staat über alles”; see 
J.H.H. Weiler, “The state ‘über alles’: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht decision”, in: O. Due et al. 
(eds), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling  Band 2 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), p. 1651–1688. This 
characterisation, however, misses the complexity of the FCC’s reasoning; for a more relaxed interpretation of the 
Maastricht decision, see A. v Bogdandy, “Das Leitbild der dualistischen Legitimation für die europäische 
Verfassungsentwicklung: gängige Missverständnisse des Maastricht-Urteils und deren Gründe (BVerfGE 89, 
155 ff.)” in 83 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (2000) at 284-297. 
8
  See Dieter Grimm’s famous intervention against a European constitution: “Does Europe need a 
constitution”, 1 ELJ (1995) at 282, and the criticism of Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does 
Europe need a constitution?’”, in 1 ELJ (1995) at 303-307 and in his seminal work Between Facts and Norms 
(Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Giandomenico Majone has taken a different stance: for him, the EU 
regulatory system has a positive and effective regulatory function, but beyond this function there is no room and 
no legitimacy for any distributive politics, G. Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of 
Standards, 4 ELJ (1998) at 5. This view, however, ignores the redistributive effects of every form of regulation: 
even if a norm appears to be ‘purely technical’ on the surface, it still affects actors in a different manner. 
9
  Ch. Joerges/E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford/Portland OR: 
Hart, 1999); F.W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe – Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998); G. Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996). 
10
  A. v. Bogdandy, Gubernative Rechtssetzung (Tübingen: Mohr, 2000); see, also, R. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU 
Law and the Transformation of European Governance”, in: Ch. Joerges/R. Dehousse (eds.), Good 
Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207. 
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Secondly, parliaments do not act in a social vacuum, but within a societal sphere that 
is influenced, and partially even dominated, by aggregated interests and conflicting positions. 
A patchwork of unions, employer associations, political parties, NGOs, religious groups, and 
many other actors do not merely complement the law-generating political process, but 
basically constitute this process by participating in public debates about, amongst others, 
market regulation and social regulation. Here lies the core of what is widely identified as the 
democratic problem of supranational and international regulation/governance: at global level, 
the lack of parliamentarianism is accompanied by the lack of a strong global civil society, 
global political parties, and a global socio-political sphere in which conflict about social 
regulation can be played out in the open. In other words, it seems that the social humus 
necessary for a democratic process worthy of the name does not exist at global level. 
Deliberative democracy11 ends at the national borders.12 
This does not mean that democracy above or beyond the nation state is actually 
impossible or theoretically unthinkable, it is just not in sight. But if we still take the concept 
of law seriously, and, with it, the normative assumption that norms need to be legitimised in 
order to be called ‘law’, then it is worth examining the possible functional equivalents to the 
norm-generating setting of the nation-state: participatory arrangements ensuring the 
involvement of civil society actors, stakeholders, and the public, in the arguing, bargaining, 
and reasoning processes of transnational regulation, procedural rights safeguarding these 
procedural positions, and courts or court-like institutions that flank these arrangements. These 
potential functional equivalents – as elements of a deliberative constitutionalism13 - do not 
replace the democratic process necessary for a production of legitimate law, but they might 
narrow the legitimacy gap between the ongoing process of transnational social regulation and 
democratic constituencies. 
Clearly, it is the EU that represents the most advanced supranational entity that 
generates binding norms, without simultaneously being a state in the classical sense. The 
regulatory system of the EU is, therefore, a prime candidate for additional value potentials: 
Can the EU thus be taken as ‘role model’ for a general legal framework of transnational 
governance (see below Section III)? In order to answer this question, though, criteria for an 
assessment are needed. A look at legal philosophy and sociology of law approaches towards 
the problem of transnational governance without parliament may provide such a perspective. 
                                                          
11
  Here I refer to the notion of deliberative democracy as unfolded by J. Habermas in his book Between Facts 
and Norms (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 1996) and in his later work The Inclusion of the Other 
(Cambridge/Mass: MIT Press, 1998), with an additional reference to G. Frankenberg’s concept of 
republicanism; see G. Frankenberg, Die Verfassung der Republik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), and 
the theory of civil society, see U. Rödel/G. Frankenberg/H. Dubiel, Die demokratische Frage (Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1989). Frankenberg, Rödel and Dubiel correctly stress the idea that social integration is the 
result of societal conflicts; as a consequence, there is a need for elaborate frameworks in which conflicts are 
staged. This issue cannot be broadened here. 
12
  On the challenges of a trans- or supranational constellation for the concept of deliberative democracy, see D. 
Curtin, Postnational Democracy. The EU in Search of a Political Philosophy (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1997). 
13
  For the concept of Deliberative Constitutionalism, see P. Nanz, “Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational 
Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory”, in Ch. Joerges/E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Transnational 
Trade Governance and Social Regulation: Tensions and Interdependencies (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
forthcoming 2006). 
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II. JUSTIFYING GLOBAL ‘LAW’ WITHOUT CONSTITUENCIES 
Global governance generally lacks any legal patterns of public or democratic participation. 
Thus, as stated above, the growing exercise of regulatory authority by international or 
supranational governmental decision-makers in a wide variety of fields and in a wide variety 
of forms raises serious legitimacy problems. Institutionalised entities, such as the EC Council 
or more loosely connected networks of government officials, constantly make decisions in a 
no-man’s land between politics and law. Additionally, statements or decisions stemming from 
global arrangements in which governments are involved convey – especially if compared to 
actions of non-governmental actors - an additional claim for legitimacy because they are 
constituted by public authorities. 
On the other hand, there is at least some kind of legitimising chain which links supra-
national and international actors to constituencies. International treaties, for example, 
regularly have to be approved in one way or another by the national parliament before they 
become domestic law, and treaty-derived institutions such as the parliamentary assembly of 
the European Convention on Human Rights guarantee at least a certain degree of reference to 
national constituencies. The representatives of national bureaucracies sent out to take part in 
international governmental networks and fora are at least formally linked to the national 
governments and are, at least theoretically, controlled by national parliaments. 
Nevertheless, democracy and the rule of law are at stake if the executive branch of 
government is released from the chains of intense parliamentary/public control and of judicial 
review. Additionally, empirical research on the patterns of globalisation draws our attention to 
the enormous amount of non-state (‘private’) regulations that shape and rule transnational 
business relations and international trade. Private standard-setting bodies, agreements on 
technical norms, and other forms of regulative activities suggest that we are observing a major 
shift, if not a change of paradigm, from state regulation and international law regulations to 
private international regulations.14 At the same time, we are experiencing a major increase in 
‘hybrid’ activities, namely, in co-operative international activities of national governments 
and private actors.15 Both the tendencies of extended private governance activities and the 
hybridisation of international actors can be integrated in the compromise formula that “the 
new legal order is working significant transformations in governance arrangements, both 
locally and globally, suggesting that the distinction between the public and the private realms 
is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain” (Claire Cutler).16 
Beyond popular slogans warning us against the end of the nation state or even 
welcoming this trend, the factual developments towards international regulatory regimes can 
                                                          
14
  Private Governance regimes as described and examined, for example, by C. Cutler, J. Braithwaite/P. Drahos, 
or H. Schepel, play a significant role in the global political economy: see C. Cutler, Private Power and 
Global Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business 
Regulation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private 
Governance -- Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).- 
It is, however, justified to set the main focus here on global arrangements in which governments are 
somehow involved: these arrangements convey an additional claim for legitimacy as they are constituted by 
public authorities. 
15
  As a striking example, the activities of standard-setting bodies such as the International Organisation of 
Standardisation (ISO) could be mentioned here. ISO standards are often used in national courts as legal 
benchmarks, for example, in tort cases,. Another well-know example is the function of the private 
organisation ICANN as world administrator of web site addresses. 
16
  C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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be labelled as a trend towards ‘legal globalisation’. Although a vague concept, ‘globalisation’ 
clearly reflects the loss of control over a growing number of transnational issues, e.g., 
environmental protection, regulation of international trade and international financial markets 
for national parliaments and national administrations.17 Accordingly, national governments 
try to regain control over the issues that cannot be dealt with at national level by increasing 
their efforts at international level. As a consequence, the production of law – or regulations – 
shifts from nation state level to international level. In the end, governmental actors create 
regulations without the direct involvement of constituencies, and without complementary 
courts that control the exercise of authority. 
A number of theoretical attempts have been made in recent years to face the 
challenges of a transnational legal order that significantly lacks both democratic legitimacy 
and transparency. Four distinct concepts and models of a more legitimate exercise of 
international authority can be distinguished: a plea for global democracy and/or a global state; 
the designation of governmental or private networks as co-ordinating instruments; the 
identification of global societal constitutionalism; and a normative, process-based conflict of 
laws concept which is based on transnational comity. 
1. GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND WORLD STATISM  
A first approach towards a more legitimate rule beyond the nation state (with the potential of 
generating more legitimate ‘global law’) can be characterised by the support for ‘world 
statism’ and by the invocation of global democracy. Proponents such as D. Held and O. Höffe 
see the need for an institutional design that safeguards the democratic input at global level. O. 
Höffe, in particular, has argued that we have to adhere to the Kantian premise of self-
government by building a world parliament and world government out of the existing raw 
material, i.e., the UN charter and its institutions.18 It is, indeed, tempting to use the existing 
UN institutions as a starting point for the creation of global democracy: the fact that all 
independent states are members of the General Assembly conveys a certain legitimising 
moment to this institution. There are, however, serious obstacles for such a project, both from 
an empirical perspective and from a conceptual viewpoint: the existing ‘one-state-one-vote’ 
approach clearly violates the fundamental idea of democratic representation, whereas equal 
representation could mean that half of the members of the parliament would have to be from 
(non-democratic) China. Of similar importance is the fact that there is no social humus for a 
democratic process on a global scale yet in sight. Finally, the prospect of a world state could 
pose an even greater threat to the - more or less, but still - functioning democratic systems that 
are embedded in the societies of the UN member states.19 
                                                          
17
  Globalisation’ is an umbrella term, covering a wide variety of linkages between countries that extend beyond 
economic interdependence, see M. Kahler and D.A. Lake, “Globalisation and Governance”, in: M. Kahler 
and D.A. Lake (eds.), Governance in a Global Economy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2003), 1, 3. 
18
 O. Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (München: Beck, 1999), especially 267-314. 
19
  Immanuel Kant, in his famous work ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’ [‘Perpetual Peace’], introduced the concept of a 
‘Weltbürgerrecht’, a cosmopolitan citizenship right, but stopped short of proposing a ‘world republic’. 
Instead, he painted a negative picture of such a world republic as a state: “If all is not to be lost, there can be, 
then, in place of the positive idea of a world republic, only the negative surrogate of an alliance which averts 
war, endures, spreads, and holds back the stream of those hostile passions which fear the law…” I. Kant, 
Perpetual Peace, (Boston: American Peace Society, 1897). For a comment and critique of this realist turn in 
Kant’s concept, see J. Habermas, “Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?” in: J 
Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 113-193, especially 125-131. 
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Other authors claim that there is already a global statism in the making, with or 
without democracy. For example, M. Albert, member of the Bielefeld-based Institute for 
Global Society, literally states that the earth is “on its way to global statehood” (“Die Erde auf 
dem Weg zur Weltstaatlichkeit”). He sums up developments towards an ever tighter net of 
international regulations and arrangements in a most fitting manner: 
“The exuberant quantitative growth of legal norms in the world society could 
be dismissed as a relatively unspectacular and – in the sense of global 
dynamics of modernization – expectable process of global juridification which, 
due to the absence of executive power, remains without consequences. But 
precisely here the new quality these processes of juridification have gained in 
recent years catches the eye: whether private arbitration panels such as the one 
at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or state-bound arbitration 
panels such as the one of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), or the 
International Criminal Court (ICC): all of them stand for a growing formation 
of secondary norms in the law of world society, i.e., norms that do not only set 
rules but also constitute procedures in cases of a breach of the rules, or that 
contain provisions dealing with the handling of conflicting rules 
(‘Kollisionsnormen’, norms guiding the solution of conflicts of norms). This 
reveals a sustainable maturing of the law beyond the nation state”.20 
Albert argues that these additional, procedural patterns of global law represent a new 
qualitative step in the development of world society. In his definition, ‘world statism’ does 
not mean that a sovereign world state emerges, but that global law (without a state) and global 
politics (without a state) merge into “world statism without a world state”.21 This opaque 
merger, however, represents nothing else but an alternative  description of exactly the paradox 
that we are trying to resolve. 
If comprehensive concepts of global statism and global democracy are too broad and 
unrealistic, then an evolutionary model may be an attractive alternative. Such a vision of a 
dynamic global constitutionalism, with the legal framework of the WTO as a focus point, is 
supported by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann in his contribution to this volume22 as well as in a 
number of earlier writings.23 Petersmann holds that the constitutionalisation of the WTO is a 
                                                          
20
  M. Albert, “Die Erde auf dem Weg zur Weltstaatlichkeit”, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Nr. 31/32 (26 
July 2004), http://www.das-parlament.de/2004/31-32/Thema/031.html [translation:RN]. 
21
  M. Albert, supra. This observation is widely shared; see M Albrow, The Global Age (1996), who argues of an 
already existing world state that materialises “in joint endeavours to control the consequences of technical 
advance for the environment, in shared interests in human rights and in a common fear of a nuclear 
catastrophe”, p. 173. see, also, M. Shaw’s portrait in his “Theory of the Global State” of an emerging world 
statism, albeit with a more critical tendency. Shaw holds that the emergent global state is constituted “by the 
complex articulation of the globalised Western state with the global layer of state power”. But he foresees a 
“lengthy period of struggle” fought between global democracy and anti-globalist nationalism until what he 
calls the “global-democratic revolution” can be completed; in: M Shaw, Theory of the Global State (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 269. 
22
  See E.-U. Petersmann, “Constitutionalising the WTO? Problems and Perspectives”, in Ch. Joerges/E.-U. 
Petersmann (eds.), supra note 4, chapter III. 
23
  See, for example, E.-U. Petersmann, “Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human 
Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European Integration”, 13 European Journal 
of International Law (2002), 621-650, and “Constitutional Economics, Human Rights and the Future of the 
WTO”, “Aussenwirtschaft”, Swiss Review of International Economic Relations (2003), p. 49-91. 
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positive process that serves to protect “human rights and democratic governance more 
effectively”.24 His vision, however, represents a somehow reduced idea of a constitution: 
human rights and “the constitutional functions of open markets and WTO rules for enabling 
mutually beneficial co-operation among individuals across discriminatory state barriers” stand 
at the core of his idea of a constitution of the WTO. Open markets and free trade become 
institutional expressions of individual human rights to ‘economic freedom’, while public 
goods such as environmental protection are scaled down to mere soft goals in a constitutional 
balancing process. Thus, under the supervision of this kind of global minimal state, regulatory 
preferences, such as strong labour laws, appear more as ‘discriminatory practices’ than as the 
legitimate expression of a certain national economic constitution. Embedded in an 
intergovernmental framework of international law and disembedded from national and global 
civil societies, a WTO constitutionalism may, therefore, only intensify the legitimacy crisis of 
transnational social regulation, or constrain appropriate responses to it.25 
What all these approaches have in common is that they perceive the dwindling of self-
rule powers of nation-states in a growing number of regulatory fields as an incentive for the 
creation of international institutions which somehow fill the gap between constituencies and 
transnational governance. They use the classical nation-state model, with its features of 
democratic representation, constitutional rights, accountable administration and independent 
courts, all embedded in a constitutional framework, as a blueprint and a normative reference 
point. What is striking, though, is the fact that many proponents of global democracy and 
world statism, either explicitly or implicitly, take it for granted that only parliamentarianism 
can represent the core of the nation state model of democracy, or they state the necessity of 
‘more democracy’ without seriously addressing the obvious conceptual and practical 
questions arising from such an approach: who is the electorate?, or: what are the foundations 
and the competences of a global state?, and so on. 
2. THE NETWORK METAPHOR 
The failure of positions supporting world statism and global democracy to deliver a 
convincing answer to the complex problem posed by the lack of a clearly-defined global 
public sphere, or a global electorate, has fuelled attempts to describe global authority not in 
statal terms, but with the metaphor of a network. The most recent example is A.-M. 
Slaughter’s book “A New World Order”, in which she emphasises the advantages of 
decentralised government networks at international level in contrast to the unitary world state 
vision.26  Her approach praises the flexibility, problem-solving capacity, and efficiency of 
governmental networks: normative voluntarism is replaced here by a functionalist concept. 
The stabilising effect on world peace and the actual success of governmental networks in 
addressing urgent transnational issues such as the weakening of the ozone layer, or the spread 
of nuclear raw material and nuclear technology create an efficient global order that is justified 
by its own success: 
“Global governance through government networks is good public policy for the 
world and good national foreign policy for the United States, the European 
                                                          
24
  Petersmann, supra note 22, chapter III.5.a. 
25
  R. Howse/K. Nicolaidis, “Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalising the WTO is a Step 
too Far”, in: R.B. Porter et al. (eds), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multi-lateral Trading System at the 
Millenium, (Washington/DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 227, at 230. 
26
  A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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Union, APEC members, and all developing countries seeking to participate in 
global regulatory processes and needing to strengthen their capacity for 
domestic governance. Even in their current form, government networks 
promote convergence, compliance with international agreements, and improved 
co-operation among nations on a wide range of regulatory and judicial issues. 
A world order self-consciously created out of horizontal and vertical 
government networks could go much further. It could create a genuine global 
rule of law without centralised global institutions and could engage, socialise, 
support, and constrain government officials of every type in every nation. In 
this future, we could see disaggregated government institutions – the members 
of government networks – as actual bearers of a measure of sovereignty, 
strengthening them still further but also subjecting them to specific legal 
obligations. This would be a genuinely different world, with its own challenges 
and its own promise.”27 
It is certainly inappropriate to mock this approach as an educational concept which 
aims at a global reformatory where the bureaucracies of the world learn from the most 
advanced how to govern the world.28 On the contrary, there is, indeed, an intrinsic value in 
advanced forms of bureaucratic co-operative experimentalism that may lead to creative 
solutions for pressing transnational problems.29 Problem solving, on the other hand, is not a 
purely technical or scientific process, it also demands the definition of a problem and the 
selection of an adequate solution. Output-oriented approaches tend to suppress this aspect of 
                                                          
27
  A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, 261-62. 
28
  Another reading of Slaughter’s approach could be that its tendency to functional realism has to be understood 
in the present political environment of a more and more unilaterally acting US government (see, for example, 
the article ‘Washington is criticised for Growing Reluctance to Sign Treaties’, New York Times, 4 April 
2002, on two reports of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the Lawyer’s Committee on 
Nuclear Policy about the United States’ rejection or disregard of a range of international treaties). In this 
reading, Slaughter may also try to justify international law and international treaties (and international 
lawyers) as an important element of the legal order of the United States. Her reluctance to support a more 
institutionalised form of global governance, thus, may be motivated by and directed against US unilateralism. 
She does not, however, challenge the danger of an instrumental use of international law as a means for an 
‘imperial’ or hegemonic world order, an outspoken tendency within the Bush administration and academia 
alike. For a critique of hegemonic tendencies; see,for example, M. Koskenniemi’s article “Global Legal 
Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought”, typoscript Harvard University 2005, 
available at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eci/PluralismHarvard.pdf , or N. Krisch, “More Equal Than the 
Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and U.S. Predominance in International Law”, in: M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds), 
United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 135-175. 
29
  See the seminal article by Ch. Joerges/J. Neyer on the unique structure of the EU committees system: “From 
intergovernmental bargaining to deliberative political processes : the constitutionalisation of comitology”, 3 
ELJ (1997) 273-299; another practical example of a problem-solving and issue-oriented international 
regulatory system is the “Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes 
and their disposal” from 22 March 1989 (www.basel.int), which introduced an effective system for 
controlling the exportation, importation and disposal of hazardous wastes, and  has been ratified by about 160 
UN member states so far (with the notable exception of the US). Finally, the European Union’s ‘Open 
Method of Co-ordination’ (OMC) could be mentioned here as a new and potentially creative (but also 
potentially ineffective or counter-productive) political-legal strategy of social regulation; for an extensive 
overview, see J. Zeitlin/Ph. Pochet (eds.), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action - The European 
Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005). 
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agenda-setting as well as the problem of choices, 30 for example, the critical evaluation of 
‘technical’ solutions in contested areas such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or 
embryonic stem cell research. The fact that transnational policies inevitably have distributive 
effects additionally underlines the importance of a legal and political embedding of 
transnational regulatory regimes into societal structures. 
While Slaughter rejects any attempts to set up a written global constitutional order, she 
claims that government networks are bound (or should be bound) to a set of unwritten and 
‘informal  principles’.31 However, she fails to show why the acting governments should be 
bound by vaguely defined principles of ‘global deliberative equality’ or ‘checks and 
balances’,32  instead of being bound by the solid principles of national or economic and 
political interests. It does not take spectacular incidents like the recent allegations of a ‘torture 
network’ between the US and some Middle Eastern countries to detect that governments need 
other restrictions than just informal principles of a non-binding character. Everyday practices 
of negotiation imbalances, for example, in the context of the WTO Treaty rounds, already 
show that appeals to fairness and equality are futile if they are not supported by some kind of 
procedural hard law.33 
Additionally, this kind of functional realism seems to suggest that ‘rule of law’ merely 
means that government networks are entitled to create international regulations and to call the 
result ‘law’. However, in the Anglo-American legal tradition as well as in continental legal 
traditions such as German constitutionalism, ‘rule of law’ or ‘Rechtsstaat’ convey a whole set 
of normative aspirations and ‘quality benchmarks’. By levelling the difference between 
regulations and law, and by ignoring the difference between a factual creation and the 
enforcement of international regulations and a legitimate legal order based on principles such 
as justice and fairness, A.-M. Slaughter’s re-labelling of government network regulations as 
the ‘rule of law’ seems to miss the very singularity of the category of law. 
3. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE EXAMPLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION 
OF STANDARDISATION (ISO) 
If the network metaphor stands for top-down networks of a functional global legal order that 
is detached from the ‘local level’ and its citizens, then a change of perspective may reveal 
new possible ways for a more inclusive order. Gunter Teubner’s systems theory approach 
may provide for such a change of perspective: by emphasising the self-reflexive powers of 
emerging transnational social spheres, Teubner avoids the top-down perspective of world 
statism and world constitutionalism. Instead of being inspired by ‘governmentality’ (M. 
Foucault), his approach supports a perspective in which a process of ‘bootstrapping’ within 
social spheres replaces the grand legal framework. 
                                                          
30
  A prominent example is the clash between the EU’s application of the precautionary principle in its own 
legal order and the US and other members’ interpretation of WTO regulations, especially in the context of 
protective measures under Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement); see J. Scott, “European Regulation of GMOs: Thinking about ‘Judicial Review’ in the WTO”, 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/04 (New York: NYU, www.jeanmonnet.org, 2004). 
31
  A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 245. 
32
  A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 245, 253. 
33
  See the report by W. Bello on the first Doha round, “Learning from Doha: A Civil Society Perspective from 
the South”, Global Governance 8 (2002), 273-279, especially 275-278 on factual imbalances and procedural 
shortcomings during the Doha round 2001. 
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Teubner34 has pushed the insight that we can observe an emerging global legal order 
without a sovereign world state one step further. He argues that a single (constitutional) 
fundament or framework for the production of legitimate international law is a myth, and that 
there cannot be a constitutional global framework similar to the hierarchical legal order that 
we know from nation state level. Based on systems theory, he claims that the internal 
differentiation of societies produces sub-systems with their own code and their own 
rationality, and that this has happened in the process of globalisation on a global scale, too. 
Precisely as in the traditional nation state, at international level, there is no way back to a 
unifying rationality guiding of the law-making process. Instead of a global constitutionalism 
“from above”, we observe trends towards a societal constitutionalism “from below”, in which 
social actors, traditionally not viewed as subjects of international law, are transformed into 
“constitutional subjects”. Their actions are based on strategies that use fundamental rights not 
only on a vertical level, against state power, but also – and more importantly – activate these 
rights “against social institutions, in particular vis-à-vis centres of economic power”.35 
Societal actors not only complement the process of governmental governance, they 
also constitute themselves particular spheres of legality. A constitution of world society, thus, 
“does not come about exclusively in the representative institutions of international politics, 
nor can it take place in a unitary global constitution which overlies all areas of society, but, 
instead, emerges incrementally in the constitutionalisation of a multiplicity of autonomous 
sub-systems of world society”.36 Constitutionalisation processes, he claims, are nowadays 
much more dynamic within the (private) social sub-systems of society than in the sphere of 
statal actors. The creeping constitutionalisation of these social sub-systems generates, among 
others, a juridification that includes a fundamental rights discourse: This discourse supports 
the binding force of fundamental rights within the global social sub-systems and among 
societal actors on a horizontal level. 
For a constitutional lawyer, as Teubner himself correctly observes, this concept of 
societal constitutionalism goes way beyond traditional understandings of constitutional law, 
and if taken as a normative claim it may go several steps too far. One first objection could be 
based upon the empirical premises of this approach: one may well contest his factual 
assessments, as deep analyses such as the study by Braithwaite and Drahos draw a more 
complex picture of the enormous diversity within global business regulations, ranging from 
far-reaching self-organisation to mere factual power relations without any comprehensive or 
fair structure.37 
It is, however, neither this element nor the absence of a single, overarching, binding 
‘constitutional’ document that irritates so much; instead, it is the fact that Teubner relies very 
much on the rationality and fairness of self-regulating processes in the societal spheres 
themselves. In his concept, the global social spheres, or its sub-systems, such as the Internet 
as the symbol for the global communication community, seem, on the one hand, to generate, 
                                                          
34
  G. Teubner, in: Ch. Joerges/I.-J. Sand/G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism 
(Oxford and Portland/Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004), 3. Teubner refers extensively to D. Sciully, Theory of 
Societal Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and further articles by Sciully; 
see the reference in Teubner (2004), 10 at note 24. 
35
  Teubner (note above), 7; see, also, I-J Sand’s contribution in the same volume. 
36
  Teubner (2004), 8. For a pluralist view on constitutionalism, see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism”, 65 Modern Law Review (2002), 317. 
37
  J. Braithwaite/P. Drahos, supra note 2. 
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with almost natural force, a set of second-order rules (secondary norms, a constitution). On 
the other hand, it is the set of fundamental rights that safeguards the voice and the standing of 
societal actors, an assumption that points somewhat to courts (national courts?) as the 
guardians of the private transnational law regimes, with the inherent risk that courts 
monopolise the open process of interpreting fundamental rights. What the concept of societal 
constitutionalism seems to underestimate here is the intuition that it is neither courts nor the 
specific societal spheres but the global community as a whole that is both the author and the 
addressee of fundamental rights, if understood as fundamentally as the concept of human 
rights. The judicial discourse in courts and societal sub-spheres takes place in proxy discourse 
arenas (as Stellvertreterdiskurse).38 Neither can these proxy discourses represent the global 
public discourse on the actual contents of human rights in context as a whole (including 
strong voices of dissent), nor can they sufficiently reflect or reproduce the diverse and plural 
voices and interests within world society. 
One outstanding example for the problematical results of societal constitutionalism 
may be the recent turn of the International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO)39 towards 
social issues. Originally, the ISO seemingly focused on only technical matters: what the 
measurements of a container were, what and how many sizes of wrenches there should be and 
what the definition of a wrench is, and so on. Step by step, however, ISO has moved towards 
social regulation, with the ISO 9000 family of norms providing a framework for quality 
management throughout the processes of producing and delivering products and services for 
the customer, and the ISO 14000 family covering a wide-ranging portfolio of standards for 
sampling and testing methods in order to deal with specific environmental challenges and 
monitoring standards for the management of environmental issues. 40  Right now ISO is 
preparing another wave of norms, the ISO 26000 standards. What is striking here is the fact 
                                                          
38
  An additional aspect that cannot be discussed in full detail here is that national and international legal fora 
usually follow different rules of standing and procedure: clearly individuals or individual companies have 
access to the courts in the domestic sphere; once a legal conflict has found its way to international courts or 
tribunals, however, they lose standing and become bystanders who can only appeal to their national 
government to initiate court proceedings. A striking example of this incongruity of the stakeholders and 
parties of court proceedings is the ‘Caroline’ case: In a landmark decision, the German publisher of a number 
of articles and photographs about Princess Caroline of Monaco had won its constitutional complaint lodged 
with the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) against a partial ban on the 
publication of certain photographs, see judgment of 15 December 1999 in the Case 1 BvR 653/96, BVerfGE 
101, 361-396. Against this decision, Caroline lodged a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). A chamber of the Court declared that the basic assumptions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht about 
the content and range of the freedom of the press violated the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
reserved a decision to grant her compensation (ECHR, judgment of 24 June 2004, case of von Hannover v. 
Germany, Application no. 59320/00, www.echr.coe.int). Although publishers, journalists, photographers, and 
editors pressed the German government to appeal the decision (with the effect that the case would have been 
transferred to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR), the government decided not to lodge an appeal, and the 
judgment of the ECHR became final. 
39
  For more information, see www.iso.org. The ISO is a network of the national standards institutes of 146 
countries, on the basis of one member per country, with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, which 
co-ordinates the system. It is a non-governmental organisation; nevertheless, the ISO occupies a special 
position between the public and private sectors. This is because, on the one hand, many of its member 
institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their government. On 
the other hand, other members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having been set up by national 
partnerships of industry associations. 
40
  See the ISO’s self-description of the ISO 14000 family at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-
services/otherpubs/iso14000/environment.pdf. 
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that the ISO 26000 standards are supposed to integrate something like social policy standards 
into the norm system: they will deal with the “social responsibility” of companies. The details 
of these regulations are still unclear, as the process of establishing the proposals has only just 
begun. But one can speculate that some of the norms may include ILO standards, with the 
result that a product bearing the seal ISO 26001 may indicate that it was produced without 
child labour and under humane work conditions. 
The ISO example illustrates that Teubner has a point with his assumption that the 
actors within sector-specific global legal regimes re-introduce segments of other legal orders. 
But it also shows that his concept of societal constitutionalism is too narrow, as it refers too 
much on what he calls “fundamental rights”: by taking up issues such as good corporate 
governance, environmental protection and labour conditions, the ISO has integrated 
something else, namely, ideas of “good production”, “good capitalism” or “social market 
economy”. The integration of standards that are derived from other global legal regimes also 
challenges the assumption that each “global village” only acts according to its own rationality: 
what we can observe here is more a process of establishing the voluntary links between 
different social spheres than just the activation of core human rights. If these processes are 
multiplied in other social spheres/“global villages”, the legal web becomes more and more 
dense, with private actors claiming the authority both to set and to interpret global law. 
If we cannot rely on democratic processes that guide and control the results of such 
emerging structures, and if, at global level, we lack a judiciary that may provide for at least a 
minimum of consistency within the emerging global law structure, then large fields of social 
regulation fall into the hands of what are innocently called private actors (by means of a 
creeping privatisation of public law). It is obvious that social stratifications – such as the 
North-South incline, or multi-nationals vs. locally bound industries – will have an effect on 
the outcome of regulatory processes in social spheres such as the ISO. In the case of the ISO, 
the organisation is aware of this problem, and there are efforts to strengthen the position of 
developing countries within the organisation, for example, by providing special funds or other 
technical assistance. In the WTO, we can find similar attempts to somehow deal with obvious 
imbalances with regard to institutional settings and rule-making processes.41 These efforts, 
however, are punctual and voluntarily, instead of being systematic and mandatory. 
If Teubner took constitutionalism more seriously as a concept, he would have to 
introduce some “constitutional” principles and benchmarks that help to judge whether a 
constitutionalisation process has failed, or whether the processes of rule-making and rule-
application were fair, legitimate and balanced. But the place of politics is empty (there is no 
global constituency, no parliament, and so on), and the judiciary is absent or weak. Who 
                                                          
41
  The WTO has set up a technical assistance service for developing countries that are members of the WTO, 
see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm. The Petersmann-Alston debate (see E.-
U. Petersmann, “Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European Integration”, 13 European Journal of International Law 
(2002), 621-650; Ph. Alston, “Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A 
Reply to Petersmann”, EJIL 13 (2002), 815-844; and Petersmann responding, “Taking Human Dignity, 
Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston”, 13 EJIL (2002), 845-851), 
however, highlights deeper dimensions of the problem: Is an ‘integration’ of human rights law in to WTO 
law possible, or desirable? What is meant by human rights law in this context – rights safeguarding economic 
performance, or labour rights, or social rights, or …? A widening of the scope of WTO law would have 
serious consequences, well beyond the already ongoing debate on ‘trade and…’ questions, as it might entail 
an elaborated constitutionalisation of the WTO as a world constitution. Mere technical assistance for a 
number of poorly prepared (‘underdeveloped’) countries in the framework of an expert dialogue cannot make 
up with a genuine political debate about the contents and foundation of a world constitution. 
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cares, then, about the enforcement of “fundamental rights”, or the structures of processes that 
really can be labelled as being open, participatory and deliberative? Who shields the infamous 
“autonomous sub-systems” from empire or other forms of power corruption? 
Additionally, it is litigation which finally leads to some form of judicial scrutiny and 
legal standards.42 As Harm Schepel has shown for the field of private standardisation, private 
transnational governance is linked to the law via national courts: law ‘constitutes’ private 
governance through an ex-post process of measuring the regulatory processes on standards 
borrowed from concepts of due process of law and Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Regulations issued by 
private parties may deserve recognition as constitutionally legitimate ‘law’ under much the 
same conditions “under which the American Law Institute is prepared to have common law 
claims to be pre-empted by statute: when the court is confident that the deliberative process 
by which the safety standard was established was full, fair and thorough and reflected 
substantial expertise”.43 When litigation starts, however, the damage has already been done. 
Seveso and Bhopal may have served as ex-post reasons to upgrade international standards of 
chemical production, or to integrate ‘critical’ expertise into the standard-setting process, but 
the social costs of such a trial-and-error procedure remain too high. 
The real essence of Teubner’s systems theory approach lies elsewhere: it shows the 
virtues and the weaknesses of a rights-based approach to global law that relies heavily on 
good-will actors (judges, panellists, societal actors, etc.). One of the virtues certainly lies in 
the observation that regulatory processes beyond the nation-state reflect the legal culture(s) 
they are embedded in, or even confronted with: in a similar way as in the national sphere, as 
D. Sciully and H. Schepel have shown, in the international sphere, too, the participants in 
regulatory processes expect, both from each other and from the regulatory framework which 
they create or are confronted with, that these processes meet minimum standards of fairness. 
The blind spot of this approach concerns the value and mechanism of participation 
within the processes that result in more or less binding global law: mutual observation of 
possibly conflicting regimes (the WTO and ILO, for example) is only one facet of the multi-
dimensional problem that global law without a constituency produces. If WTO norms or 
Appellate Body decisions override national norms, they have to produce more legitimacy than 
just the fact that, at one point in the past, a nation state has entered into an international treaty. 
A substantive international legal order in the making needs to be connected to the political 
constituencies that represent the primary source for legitimacy, not necessarily through direct 
elections, but at least by ways of a re-integration of public policy interests. And if we are 
facing not only punctual interventions but also a very comprehensive global regulatory 
machine “in the shadow of the law” (Christian Joerges) and under the control of (semi-) 
autonomous private regimes, we have to seek for more than just a vague form of mutual 
observation of global law regimes and ex-post litigation. Procedural safeguards which bring 
civil society back in – not only as outside protesters, but as legitimate voices – may not be last 
word, but may be an essential beginning. 
Such a normative concept of transnational procedural law – or global administrative 
law, or constitutional administrative law – may even be compatible with Teubner’s approach, 
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  For the function of international private law litigation as a tool, see R. Wai, “Conflicts and Comity in 
Transnational Governance: Private International Law as Mechanism and Metaphor for Transnational Social 
Regulation through Plural Legal Regimes”, in Ch. Joerges/E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), supra note 4. 
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  H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance – Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating 
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if his societal constitutionalism is read as political legal philosophy: the basis of societal 
constitutionalism lies in the good intention of mobilising the constitutional concept for the 
institutionalisation of self-enlightening potential within the semi-autonomous global regimes. 
The ISO example shows that there is even empirical proof of the assumption that global 
regimes somehow tend to re-integrate public law issues (e.g., social topics such as problems 
of equality and the distribution of wealth and political influence) into their own legal 
structure. It is, however, not enough to appeal to global regimes for such a re-integration of 
social or political issues – we need a systematic approach in order to make sure that the self-
enlightening potential of non-instrumental discourses can be exploited. In essence, the 
proponents of societal constitutionalism have not realised how they could conceptualise this 
relationship between societal norm production and public law. 
4. INTERNATIONAL COMITY INSTEAD OF DELIBERATIVE TRANSNATIONALISM? 
In his contribution to this volume, Christian Joerges has taken a cautious stance towards 
transnational legal governance, especially with regard to a further constitutionalisation of the 
WTO system. His approach44 favours a comity solution that rests on reciprocity of respect for 
national legal orders that are constitutionally legitimised: The thin democratic foundation of 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Panels and Appellate Bodies does not allow for a deepening of 
its inherent regulatory force – the WTO should not cross the borderlines of “judicialisation”.45 
Comitas, a sensitive humility towards constituted legal orders (although one must add, legal 
orders that are not necessarily always democratically constituted), could enhance the 
legitimacy of the rulings of the Panels and Appellate Body. Such sensitivity could – and 
indeed should – reflect the fact that, in WTO cases, we are not only confronted with a conflict 
or clash of legal norms, but also with a conflict of the legal and social philosophies underlying 
these legal orders, with a multitude of models for structuring societies and markets. Thus, 
mutual respect is a better foundation for conflict solutions. 
A recent decision of the US Supreme Court about the interpretation of the Alien Torts 
Statute (ATS), an interesting relict from revolutionary times, echoes this claim. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Brenner relates to the concept of comitas: “Since enforcement of 
an international norm by one nation`s courts implies that other nations’ courts may do the 
same,  I would ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS is consistent with those 
notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by 
limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement. In applying those principles, courts help 
assure that “the potentially conflicting laws of different nations” will “work together in 
harmony”, a matter of increasing importance in an ever more interdependent world. […]”. 
Justice Breyer adds: “Such consideration is necessary to ensure that ATS litigation does not 
undermine the very harmony that it was intended to promote.”46 
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 For a detailed analysis and critique of Ch. Joerges’ approach, see the comments of D. Chalmers, R. Nickel, F. 
Rödl and R. Wai on Ch. Joerges’ paper “Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy”, EUI Working Paper Law 
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  Ch. Joerges, Juridification Patterns for Social Regulation and the WTO: A Theoretical Framework, in Ch. 
Joerges/E.U. Petersmann (eds.), supra note 4. 
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  Concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, Cases  03-339 (Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain) and 03-485 (U.S. v. Alvarez-
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Although not identical, the ATS litigation problem, in some respects, clearly reflects 
the paradox of a comity approach: its success rests mainly on a certain process of judicial self-
restraint, and an openness towards harmonic solutions. It is inevitable, though, that court-like 
international institutions such as the WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies will be confronted 
with hard cases that resist harmonic solutions. 47  Additionally, the Panels and Appellate 
Bodies have the task of protecting the very aims of the WTO agreements and of international 
ius cogens alike, so that national laws may represent only one balancing factor among others. 
Finally, recent experiences with the – institutionally more advanced - European Court of 
Human Rights are not encouraging: the Court’s judgments tend to become more and more 
dense, with detailed corrections of rather well-discussed and elaborate national legal 
solutions. 48  A tendency towards the materialisation of the ‘soft law’ vested in flexible 
international treaties into hard international law seems to be inherent in such court-based 
arrangements. 49  It is precisely this tendency that demands creative solutions for a more 
inclusive – and less government-based – approach towards transnational law production. 
III. THE EU AS A POSITIVE MODEL FOR GLOBAL LAW PRODUCTION? 
It is not surprising that the European Union, as the most advanced supranational entity, is 
more and more frequently taken as a reference point for the development of a legitimised 
framework for transnational social regulation.50 Indeed, for the sake of the argument, it is 
useful to imagine the EU as a ‘normal’ international organisation (which it is clearly not), and 
to scrutinise how the law-generating process is structured in this entity. 
1. DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE EU 
On paper, the EU is well-suited for a democratic process; Article 6 TEU states that the EU is 
founded on the principle of democracy. The institution of the European Parliament is proof 
enough that there is a certain degree of legitimacy from below in the law-making process.51 
The EU, however, found itself for reasons which were well apparent in the late 1990’s, in the 
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focus of criticism because of its lack of democratic legitimacy: not only were the lack of full 
(or half-full) parliamentary sovereignty and the lack of an overarching European public 
sphere seen as symptoms of a regulatory structure that had reached its limits, but so were the 
regulatory structures with their opaqueness and lack of transparency. In particular, the 
prospect of ten or more new Member States and the fact that the regulatory activity of the EU 
had not only increased quantitatively but also qualitatively, with major fields of rule-making 
shifting into the core Community sphere following the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, had 
caused a widely stated sense of uneasiness with the regulatory mechanisms as a whole. 
Article 257 EC, which foresees a certain form of functional participation of the Economic and 
Social Committee in some areas, only provides for a corporatist top-down approach to civil 
society, with rather limited potentials for the production of a significant legitimacy surplus.52 
The European Commission reacted to this crisis with its famous White Paper on 
European Governance.53 Instead of taking up the popular slogan of a strengthening of the 
European Parliament, the Commission mainly focused on its own position within the 
institutional framework of the EU. It identified five principles of “good governance”, three of 
which were directly related to the legitimacy issue: 1) openness: “The Institutions should 
work in a more open manner. Together with the Member States, they should actively 
communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it takes.(…)”; 2) participation, with 
the need to ensure wide participation of interested actors “throughout the policy chain – from 
conception to implementation”, because “improved participation is likely [to] create more 
confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies”; and 3) 
accountability: “Roles in the legislative and executive processes need to be clearer. Each of 
the EU Institutions must explain and take responsibility for what it does in Europe.”54 
By stressing the issues of participation, openness and accountability, the Commission 
reacted to popular criticism about its own performance as a non-transparent regulatory 
machine that seemingly runs on itself. In this regard, it was an intelligent move to use the 
concept of “governance” instead of “government” as a reference point; this shift in the 
nomenclature lowers the expectations to a significant degree: 
“Governance is not political rule through responsible institutions, such as 
parliament and democracy – which amounts to government – but innovative 
practices of networks, or horizontal forms of interaction. It is a method for 
dealing with political controversies in which actors, political and non-political, 
arrive at mutually acceptable decisions by deliberating and negotiating with 
each other.”55 
In order to prove that the commitment to participation, transparency, and openness is 
not merely lip service, the Commission later published a code of conduct for its interaction 
with civil society actors. This document contained the promise that civil society would be 
included in deliberations on legislative acts as soon as possible and as comprehensively as 
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possible.56 Additionally, in 2001, a new regulation on access to EU documents came into 
effect, significantly raising the level of effectiveness of transparency rights.57 
While the White Paper issues of openness and transparency were dealt with in a more 
thorough way through the introduction of a clearer legal basis for the access to documents, the 
it’s commitment to participation did not bring about any satisfactory results in the following 
years. The Council and its Secretariat, which had, in the course of five decades, evolved into a 
second major administrative-legislative institution parallel to the Commission, was left 
completely out of the discussions about enhanced public participation. The above-mentioned 
code of conduct of the Commission, laid out in December 2002 in a “Communication of the 
Commission”, does not have any legally-binding force and cannot be used by third parties in 
court: the mere self-binding force of an internal Commission regulation does not entitle 
citizens to gain access to committees or other fora, nor does it contain other possible 
participatory rights such as the right to be consulted, or the duty to take contributions of 
participants into account when delivering the grounds for a decision. Additionally, the 
document expressly exempts crucial areas of decision-making processes from the consultation 
process, especially “Decisions taken in a formal process of consulting Member States 
(‘comitology’ procedure)”.58 
In this respect, the Commission remains firmly within the ‘Community method’ of 
practising consultation according to its preferences and under its conditions. Under this 
classical method of decision-making, wide consultation is not a completely new phenomenon, 
on the contrary: as its Communication on Consultations correctly points out, the Commission 
has a long tradition of consulting interested parties from outside when formulating its policies. 
It incorporates external consultation into the development of almost all its policy areas.59 The 
underlying philosophy of this consultation policy – that consultation processes are initiated by 
the institution, participation is limited to non-decision, and only directed towards selected 
actors – did not change after the publication of the White Paper. Calling the White Paper 
approach to public participation and the subsequent policy as laid out in the Commission’s 
“Communication” a substantively new approach would, thus, be a misnomer.60 
In summary, in the light of the principle of participatory democracy, notwithstanding 
the first steps of the Commission towards a more inclusive legal structure, the current level of 
public participation in the norm-generating processes of the EU is still not satisfying: the 
basic assumption that all those affected by legal norms should have the chance to participate 
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in the deliberation and decision making process regarding the said norms61 has clearly not 
been met by the current institutional and legal design of the EU. The 2001 Laeken Declaration 
of the IGC also underlined the fact that the legitimacy gap is still a serious issue, and the 
seemingly failed attempt to establish a formal European Constitution, with the referenda in 
France and the Netherlands turning out a vote against the Draft Constitution, has deepened the 
legitimacy crisis of the EU even more. 
2. NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
However, instead of insisting on a clear-cut separation between national democracies and 
supranational government networks, it may be worth visiting the transition zone between 
governance and government that was established through the so-called New Modes of 
European Governance. The most prominent modes of a specific European governance setting 
are the committee system, also called Comitology, and the Open Method of Co-ordination. 
The numerous EU committees, legally anchored in a rather opaque reference in Article 
202 TEC, and in the 1999 Council decision “laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission”,62 play an outstanding role in the law-
making process of the EU. They gather expertise and discuss solutions; for this purpose, 
hundreds of representatives of the Member States, usually, but not necessarily, members of 
national administrations, congregate on a regular basis. Chaired by a Commission 
representative, the Committees formulate and adopt measures of various kinds. 63  While 
Comitology is viewed by many with suspicion, mainly due to the character of the system as 
“technocratic structures behind closed doors”,64 Joerges and Neyer, in their famous 1997 
contribution, have suggested a radical new vision of Comitology as a forum for deliberative 
supranationalism in which all participants engage in the search for the common good.65 
Viewed from this angle, Comitology is a borderline case 66  that seems to resists a clear 
characterisation as governance or government. Others have interpreted the Open Method of 
Co-ordination,67 a soft approach towards co-ordinated policies in areas where the EU has no 
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regulatory competences, as a desirable and even more advanced instrument of deliberative 
policy-co-ordination on the supranational level,68 a clearly contestable view.69 
With reference to theories dealing with deliberative structures, one can distinguish 
between the tenants of “expert deliberation” and the tenants of “public deliberation.”70 In its 
White Paper, the Commission acknowledged the importance of deliberative structures within 
the EU framework; on the former, the White Paper on Governance points to the role of expert 
advice in EU policy-making: “Scientific and other experts play an increasingly significant 
role in preparing and monitoring decisions”, and in the area of “…social legislation, the 
Institutions rely on specialist expertise to anticipate and identify the nature of the problems 
and uncertainties that the Union faces, to take decisions and to ensure that risks can be 
explained clearly and simply to the public”.71 
While the Comitology system does represent a mode of deliberative governance, its 
mechanisms should not be confused with the characteristics of deliberative democracy. As 
pointed out by Cohen and Sabel, “Deliberation, understood as reasoning about how to best 
address a practical problem, is not intrinsically democratic: it can be conducted within 
cloistered bodies that make fateful choices, but are inattentive to the views or the interests of 
large numbers of affected parties”. 72  Deliberative democracy fundamentally relies on 
participatory conditions for policy-making; these conditions are not met by the Comitology 
procedures: although national administrations are not forced to send only one representative 
and only public officials into the committees, a comprehensive representation of national or 
EU civil society actors is neither mandatory nor the practice. 
3. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE EU: AN EMERGING CONCEPT? 
Beyond the rather limited, unstructured, and quite unsystematic influences of civil society 
actors on the Comitology procedures and European agency actions, there are currently no 
general laws or legally-binding provisions in effect that could safeguard the participation of 
interest groups, NGOs, or other social actors in the law-generating processes under the 
supervision of the Commission. 
Only in the field of environmental law has a move towards enhanced civic 
participation been made. This movement towards broad-based participation was fostered by 
the Aarhus Convention of the UN, which was signed by all EU Member States.73 It led to 
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“Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
public access to environmental information”74 which transformed the demands of the Aarhus 
Convention into binding EU law. However, Directive 2003/4/EC does not constitute a form of 
general administrative law; the directive is confined to a clearly defined area of EU 
environmental law. 
There are signs, however, that broader defined participative rights may find their way, 
step by step, into the fibre of EU law and regulatory procedures, creating a general framework 
for participatory governance. The Draft Constitutional Treaty, notwithstanding its unclear 
political and legal future, provides its own subtitle (Title VI) dealing with “The Democratic 
Life of the Union”, with separate articles defining the scope of representative democracy 
(Article 46) and participatory democracy (Article 47). Article 47 reads as follows: 
“Article I-47: 
The principle of participatory democracy 
1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views 
in all areas of Union action. 
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue 
with representative associations and civil society. 
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned 
in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent. 
4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number 
of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within 
the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters 
where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose 
of implementing the Constitution. European laws shall determine the 
provisions for the procedures and conditions required for such a citizens’ 
initiative, including the minimum number of Member States from which such 
citizens must come.” 
The scope of these provisions is clearly limited, and the underlying concept of 
participatory democracy is admittedly rather thin: participation is more than just the 
opportunity to express an opinion (paragraph 1), or the opportunity to enter into a dialogue 
whose conditions and consequences are unclear (paragraph 2). In contrast to these provisions, 
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the consultations mentioned in paragraph 3 sound more serious, but only in cases where they 
take place in a real space with discussants and an auditorium present, and not merely in 
cyberspace: written statements cannot replace the exchange of ideas and views in real time, in 
person, and before a forum. Unfortunately, paragraph 3 falls short of a clearer definition of 
consultations. Most importantly, Article 47 completely fails to mention any kind of 
procedural right to participation, nor does it foresee any legal remedy in case of conflict over 
the conditions of a consultation process. In this regard, the Draft Constitutional Treaty does 
not break away from the thin concept of participation the Commission proposed in its White 
Paper. 
These conceptual shortcomings notwithstanding, Article 47 constitutes the first 
window of opportunity for a more comprehensive involvement of civil society in the law-
making process of the EU. It also underlines that participatory democracy is – or will be - a 
genuine legal principle of EU law. 
4. THE ECJ: THE GUARDIAN OF “GOOD GOVERNANCE” IN THE EU? 
One of the major preconditions of substantive participation in a deliberative process – such as 
the regulatory fora of Comitology - is the access to comprehensive information about the 
process itself: who discusses what, and when, what the positions of the participants are before 
they enter the process, and so on. These issues are essential for any active involvement. A 
landmark case of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) highlights the problems and pitfalls of 
the existing legal framework for access to information: the Rothmans case illustrates the 
oscillating character of the EC/EU between intergovernmental governance and a rights-based 
community of European citizens. 
By letter of 23 January 1997, the Rothmans company, a famous cigarette 
manufacturer, had requested access to a number of documents which included the minutes of 
the Customs Code Committee from 4 April 1995 onwards.75 Rothmans probably had heard 
that the Commission planned to take actions against illegal imports of cigarettes through third 
countries such as Romania or Bulgaria into the European Union. Many indicators pointed to 
the active involvement of cigarette manufacturers in these illegal activities. The reasons why 
Rothmans had approached the Commission (and not the Customs Code Committee directly) 
were simple: like all committees assisting and counselling the Commission, this one did not 
have its own administration, budget, archive or premises, nor an address of its own. 
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect Taxation forwarded 
a number of Commission documents, but refused to hand over the minutes of the Committee 
on the ground that the Commission was not their author.76 It pointed out that, while the 
minutes are drawn up by the Commission in its secretarial capacity, they “are adopted by the 
Committee, which is therefore their author”. The Commission also refused to hand over the 
Committee's internal regulation on the ground that the Commission was not the author of that 
document, either. Finally, it stated that, under that regulation, the Committee's proceedings 
are confidential. In June 1997, Rothmans brought an action against the Commission before 
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the Court of First Instance, and requested the annulment of the Commission’s decisions 
denying access to the minutes and the internal regulation of the Committee. 
This case was a landmark case in three respects: firstly, it challenged the practice of 
the Commission to retreat behind some form of intergovernmental confidentiality; secondly, it 
brought up the question of what the real mechanisms behind the Commission’s regulatory 
actions are: how does the EU bureaucracy actually work, and what is the role of the 
Committees?; and finally, the case demanded a clarification of the openness, transparency, 
and accessibility of the EU bureaucracy: are citizens entitled to control the administrative 
process, and to what extent? 
Rothmans demanded less than participation, but a minimum amount of openness and 
transparency in the Committee structure. The important role of Comitology in the law-making 
process of the EU – as briefly outlined above – underlines that the Commission and “its” 
committees have left the originally intended function of the committees as intergovernmental 
control mechanism far behind. They have turned into a unique, “freewheeling transnational 
structure”,77 with its own merits as deliberative forums, but also without a clear legal structure 
or form. In particular, the poor transparency of the committee procedures “makes it difficult 
to discern the part played by the committees in the formulation and eventual adoption of 
measures”.78 
The Rothmans case shows that the fact that the committees do not formally possess 
decision-making powers of their own tends to complicate judicial review of committees’ 
work. Additionally, as R. Dehousse describes it, the “indirect character of the review process, 
compounded by the more general difficulty experienced by private parties seeking annulment 
of community decisions, reduces incentives to rely on litigation to ensure the proper 
functioning of committees.”79 Indeed, the structure of judicial review, as laid out in Articles 
220-245 TEC, strongly supports this observation: while the reference procedure of Article 234 
TEC represents the “normal” procedure in which a national court refers a case to the ECJ in 
the event of doubts about the interpretation and implementation of EU law, individual access 
to the Court of First Instance is granted only under strict conditions.80 
Because Rothmans had been denied access to the minutes individually, the conditions 
for individual access had been met. As to the material question concerning Rothmans’ right to 
access to the minutes, the position of the Commission amounted to a paradoxical – and 
embarrassing – situation: committees are supposed to be an emanation of the Council, they 
inform and control the measures of the Commission. But the Council does not hold copies of 
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committee documents. Thus, the argument of the Commission that it held the pen for the 
committee but was not the author of the documents amounted to an exclusion of Comitology 
from the scope of the rules granting access to Community documents.81 
In its judgment, the Court of First Instance (CFI) resolved the case in favour of the 
right to access and stressed the importance of the principle of transparency. It held that “for 
the purposes of the Community rules on access to documents, ‘Comitology’ committees come 
under the Commission itself,…which is responsible for rulings on the applications for access 
to documents of those committees”.82  With its decision, the CFI paid tribute to the new 
governance amalgam of Commission and committees that is called “Comitology”. 
While the ECJ decision can be seen as a major step towards a more transparent 
Comitology procedure, transparency itself is not sufficient for the effective control of 
Comitology from outside of the governance network. It may grant access to information, but 
it does not lend a more active role to individuals or to the civil society sector in the decision-
making process. A starting point for a procedural approach to social regulation in the 
committee framework can be found in a second decision of the European Court of Justice 
relating to Comitology procedures. In the Germany vs. Commission case, the ECJ declared a 
regulation on construction materials void on the grounds that procedural rules had been 
violated; allegedly, the draft for a decision had not been sent within a certain time-frame to 
the Member State, and not in the right language.83 In a number of other decisions, the ECJ has 
further shaped procedural aspects of European administrative law,84 albeit without spelling 
out clear general rules for all fields of EU law with regard to legal consequences of violations 
of procedural law. 
If civil society actors were entitled to the same procedural position as the Member 
States possess in the Comitology procedures, and the Commission were responsible for the 
dissemination of draft regulations (and accountable for infringements of those procedural 
rights), the Comitology system would lose a good part of its secretive character. This may 
lessen the effectiveness of the European rule-making governmental network to a certain 
degree, but it may strengthen the system in the long run, and it will certainly enhance the 
legitimacy of EU law. The emerging concept of participatory governance points into this 
direction, but it must also be accompanied by an EU administrative law that explicitly defines 
the scope of civil society participation; it is not the task of the ECJ to invent such a procedural 
framework. 
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IV.  A LOOK FORWARD: CONSTITUTING PARTICIPATORY TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
Is transnational law possible, or to be more precise, under which conditions does the growing 
amount of transnational regulation through transnational governance, public or private, 
deserve recognition? This riddle of transnational law/‘law’ apparently cannot be solved once 
and for all in a neat manner by zooming nation state institutions up to global level. The 
tentative answer supported here stresses the importance of civic participation: transnational 
‘law’, produced outside a classical constitutional framework, and without genuine democratic 
institutions, needs additional sources of justification with legitimatory force. 
Concepts of world statism or of a global minimal state do not provide for these 
additional sources. On the contrary, these abstract visions disregard not only the factual 
preconditions for a functioning democratic process of law-production, they also do not 
sufficiently take into account that only a law-generating process where those subjugated to the 
regulations (the ‘law’) can - at least potentially - view themselves at the same time also as 
their authors may provide the essential element of legitimacy; this separates such regulations 
from mere power structures. The wide gap between abstract visions and the concrete 
regulations which affect real people in their everyday lives can hardly be bridged by an 
abstract constitutionalisation of international law. Even if the project is disconnected from a 
world-state vision, as Jürgen Habermas has recently proposed, 85  the core problem of a 
constitutionalisation process remains: how is constitutionalisation without a strong (global) 
civil society and without the inclusion of local civil societies possible? 
In this regard, the evolution of the EU may provide some preliminary answers: Its 
tendencies towards a better and broader inclusion of citizens and civil society, 
notwithstanding the existing shortcomings, reflect the attempt to bridge the legitimacy gap 
between transnational law and local constituencies. A similar approach towards transnational 
law on a global scale would call for some form of juridification of participatory governance, 
not necessarily as another form of an overarching ‘constitution’ in a single text, but as a 
juridification of deliberative structures within the regulatory islands of international law and 
international regulation. 
Procedural rules, and, in particular, participatory rights in the domain of transnational 
social regulation, decide about agenda-setting and co-decision positions to a much higher 
degree than within the national constitutional framework, where decision-making procedures 
in governmental regulatory regimes or in private societal spheres are still controlled by both 
parliaments and by a genuine democratic process, and are embedded in a constitutional setting 
of administrative rules and judicial control. The less direct the democratic input in 
transnational social regulation is, however, the more direct the participatory influence of the 
social actors, or even of an emerging global civil society, has to be. A mere superstructural 
network of governments and powerful private players amounts more to a return to some form 
of benevolent and enlightened absolutism rather than to “good” transnational governance. 
This correlation between the loss of democratic power in the national arenas and the 
growing material regulation in the transnational sphere has to be reflected and confronted 
within the existing global legal structures. As transnational processes are dominated by public 
or private administrators, the law of the transnational regulation co-ordinating these processes 
has to integrate the possible functional equivalents of national legitimatory processes. One 
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element of such a juridification of transnational regulation may consist of the procedural right 
of affected interest groups and civic associations to participate comprehensively in regulatory 
processes, following the existing concepts of interest representation86 that already form an 
integral part of some domestic administrative laws throughout the world, and the deepening 
participatory patterns which the international community has already agreed upon in the 
past.87 Civil society organisations participating in transnational regulatory structures enlarge 
the range of viewpoints and arguments present in deliberative decision-making processes.88 
This may not solve all the problems of democratic legitimacy above the nation-state level, but 
it will certainly lead to a more inclusive – and possibly more legitimate - global legal 
community. 
1. TRANSNATIONAL CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
General demands for better participation, clearer decision-making structures and transparency, 
and for rules and procedures for accountability have been raised in the context of global 
public governance for years. Events such as the massive protests at the G7/G8 summits in 
Seattle 1999 and Genova 2001 against the present state and development of globalisation89 
have shed light on the opaque character of global governance in general. 
Some global institutions and regimes have reacted to this criticism, others have not.90 
The World Bank is a striking example of a radical change: under its president James 
Wolfensohn, it has launched several initiatives to counter the secretive character of the bank’s 
policy-planning and decision-making procedures. By decentralising the Bank, by working 
more closely with other development partners, such as NGOs, and placing greater emphasis 
on home-grown development planning, the World Bank claims that, under Wolfensohn’s 
presidency, it has tried to move closer to its client governments “than ever before”.91 With 
additional efforts to reach out more to other international organisations, to the private sector 
and to civil society (the Bank states that NGOs now participate in a significant number of its 
projects, and that Wolfensohn has also made partnership with the private sector a central part 
of the activities92) the World Bank has tried hard to become the Musterknabe of global 
institutions. 
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Other institutions, in particular the WTO, have strongly opposed such an opening 
towards civil society. Even rather limited forms of outside interference such as amicus curiae 
briefs were - and still are – the subject of enduring controversies: the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review (WPAR) do not contain clear rules on the admissibility of unsolicited 
amicus curiae statements handed in by outsiders such as NGO’s or individuals, nor do they 
contain an explicit exclusion of such statements, either.93 In a pragmatic move, the Appellate 
Body stated in the Shrimp-Turtles case, that it has the authority to accept amicus curiae 
briefs,94 a position the Body has since affirmed in subsequent decisions.95 
This small amount of progress notwithstanding, the WTO is still  – and still perceives 
itself to be – a club with exclusive ‘membership privileges’ (Robert Howse). A 2004 report by 
an advisory committee to the Directorate General of the WTO on “The Future of the WTO” 
dedicates 8 of its 80 pages to “Transparency and dialogue with civil society”. It describes the 
relationship between global civil society and international institutions such as the WTO as a 
“new partnership” with “tensions”, but also as a “welcome and beneficial experience”.96 The 
report justifies this extremely cautious approach towards the inclusion of civil society with the 
limited capacity of the WTO Secretariat. Additionally, it states that the WTO member 
governments are themselves the ones that must shoulder most of the responsibility for 
developing the relationships between civil society and state actors. In the end, the report only 
acknowledges that “the WTO needs to keep the options of transparency and dialogue with 
civil society under regular review”.97 
The latter characterisation of the inclusion of civil society in decision-making 
processes as mere ‘dialogue’ comes very close to the attitude of the European Commission 
towards civil society participation: in its White Paper, the Commission’s bow to civil society 
did not go much further than the proposal of regular ‘consultations’. The much-praised 
convention method that was first used for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and later for 
the Draft Treaty on the European Constitution, turned out to be a practical example of the 
deficiencies of mere consultations. Civil society organisations were given only very limited 
space and time for the presentation of their viewpoints, and the website that was meant to be a 
place where citizens’ concerns could be voiced did not have any traceable effect: nobody 
knows if or who ever read the contributions that were posted there. In the end, there was only 
room for a symbolic role of civil society in the constitution making process. 
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2. A CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION IN SUPRANATIONAL RULE-MAKING 
The WTO report on its future shape and development deals extensively with the questions of 
how best to engage with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and how to raise its own 
transparency and negotiate with non-state actors, while, at the same time, dealing with their 
criticisms. This shows that the authors could not ignore the changes in world society during 
the decade following the establishment of the WTO: in the post-Seattle and post-Genova era, 
civil society98 “is here to stay” as one of the global forces that have to be taken into account.99 
This ‘official’ establishment of civil society as a global force, however, also marks the end of 
an unconditional welcome of civil society into global politics and law: as Neera Chandhoke 
puts it, “it has ceased to be a ‘hurrah’-concept”.100 The North-South divide, an institutional 
and financial superiority of NGO’s and civil society actors from the most advanced ’Western’ 
countries, and the, sometimes, problematical internal structures of the decision-making and 
funding of NGOs are some of the factors that demand a closer look at the specific conditions 
of civil society participation. 
A popular argument against a stronger role of civil society in transnational regulatory 
structures goes much further: The wider and deeper participation of NGOs and other parts of 
civil society is doomed to foster neo-feudal structures or neo-corporatism. John Bolton, the 
new US ambassador at the UN, has argued that “it is precisely the detachment from 
governments that makes international civil society so troubling, at least for democracies”. He 
does not even shy away from a comparison with fascism: as “the civil society idea actually 
suggests a ‘corporativist’ approach to international decision-making”, it is “dramatically 
troubling for democratic theory because it posits ‘interests’ (whether NGOs or business) as 
legitimate actors along with popularly elected governments”. As corporativism, according to 
Bolton, was at the heart of Italian fascism, “Mussolini would smile on the Forum of Civil 
Society. Americanists do not.”101 
In a less polemic reading, this intervention, may, indeed, point towards a strong 
argument against the establishment of civil society participation beyond protest and comment. 
However, it misses the point in several ways. It firstly envisions a concept of civil society that 
reflects a market-place model of competing organised interests, thus rejecting the notion of 
deliberative decision-making within public spheres; it secondly presupposes that 
“international decision-making” is exclusively managed by governments alone and not by a 
joint co-operation with certain business interests, and thirdly, it tries to shield a process of 
vastly executive decision-making that is only remotely connected to democratic self-
government. 
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The topic of participation and its conflict with (democratic) representation is familiar 
from the nation state discussions about concepts of democratic rule. As Carol Pateman has 
shown, ‘realist’ and functionalist concepts of democracy have dominated the discourse on 
democracy and representation since the 1940s and 1950’s, shaping a view of democracy as a 
political method (as opposed to a normative concept of self-government) through which the 
active élites of a society take the decisions for the passive and disinterested citizens.102 Since 
then, the emergence of an active citizenship outside channeled ways of political will-
formation (political parties, unions) has eroded the empirical foundation of such a concept. 
Modern democracies are characterised by a huge diversity of public interest groups and 
voluntary associations that voice concerns and debate public-policy issues beyond narrowly 
defined economic interests. 
These concerns, issues and perspectives (such as environmental protection, or poverty) 
voiced by civil society are hardly represented within global regulatory networks – a single 
government representative per country in such a regulatory network simply cannot be 
understood as an agent of a whole constituency and its internal diversity. The fact that global 
governance is widely shielded from dissent and opposition has clearly fuelled the emergence 
of a global civil society,103 especially because nationally rooted civil society actors see the 
need to create global networks in order to increase the chances of getting their voices heard.104 
In this regard, a wider inclusion of civil society actors in transnational regulation 
should instead be viewed as an antidote to ‘corporativist’ influences on regulatory processes, 
and not as a way of fostering it. This holds true especially in the area of transnational 
economic regulation: as in the Grimm Brothers’ tale of the hare and the hedgehog, certain 
business interest are always there and present, anyway. Gregory C. Shaffer has described this 
reality in the following words: 
“The growing interaction between private enterprises and US and EC public 
representatives in most trade claims reflects a trend from predominantly 
intergovernmental decision making toward multi-level private litigation 
strategies involving direct public-private exchange at the national and 
supranational levels. Given the trade-liberalising rules of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), this trend has an outward-looking, export-promoting 
orientation composed of more systematic challenges, in particular by large and 
well-organized commercial interests, to foreign regulatory barriers to trade. 
International trade disputes are, in consequence, not purely public or 
intergovernmental. Nor do they reflect a simple cooptation by businesses, 
particularly large and well-organised businesses, of government officials. 
Rather, they invoke the formation of public-private partnerships to pursue 
varying but complementary goals. The development of these public-private 
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partnerships is seen in the actual handling (the “law in action”) of most 
commercial trade disputes, as opposed to the law in the books reflected in the 
relevant provisions of WTO agreements, US statutes, EC regulations, and the 
EC’s founding treaty.”105 
This finding underlines that the problem of representativeness has to be viewed from a 
different angle: if certain interests are already present in the agenda-setting and decision-
making processes, then civic participation means opening up these structures to non-
represented groups and interests, thus broadening the agenda and safeguarding a more 
inclusive representation of societal interests and viewpoints. The problem of representation 
certainly remains and cannot be solved in a perfectly consistent manner: participatory 
governance is not meant to replace democratic representation. Increasing research by political 
and social scientists about interest representation in the EU, 106  however, supports the 
conclusion that some relevant criteria may be found, criteria which can safeguard a maybe not 
perfect, but somehow proper, representation of civil society through organised interests and 
voluntary associations. These criteria, once spelled out in legal documents with binding force, 
will open fora for contestation and dissent within transnational regulatory institutions and 
networks. 
Situated between co-decision powers and mere consultations, the principle of 
participatory governance can be filled with context-sensitive contents, reaching from notice 
and comment provisions and transparency regulations, through rights to a hearing by 
regulatory institutions and networks, up to procedural involvement that stops short of a veto 
position. As long as visions of a global democracy remain a distant hope, a concept of 
participatory transnational governance is the second best solution for integrating societal 
diversity into the ‘law of law-production’ (R. Wiethölter). And it can also tackle the other side 
of the coin, the nightmare visions of a global super-state: participatory transnational 
governance is a crucial element for a redirection of ‘intergovernmentality’ and its regulatory 
networks towards a more inclusive law/‘law’-production. 
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